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Abstract 
This st1,1dy analyzed empirical data for evidence of credit rationing in rural 
financial markets of the Philippines. Quantity rationing of loans is widely practiced 
by rural banks, while outright loan rejection is prevalent in commercial and private 
development banks. Collateral is important in the rationing process, creating serious 
implications for land reform. 
CREDIT RATIONING UNDER A DEREGULATED FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 
RURAL FINANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES 
I. Issues in Credit Rationing 
One of the major objectives of financial reform in the Philippines is to 
enhance efficiency in financial intermediation and make access to credit easier for 
all types of borrowers. These changes are expected to bring about increased invest-
ments and higher productivity among economic units in the country. But the lifting 
of interest rate controls has to date failed to produce wide access to credit by 
farmers and rural households (Lamberte, 1989). Borrowers complain more about 
the lack of credit than about its price. It appears that banks exercise some degree 
of "credit rationing" by non-price mechanisms in an environment in which interest 
rates can be freely adjusted. 
The recent literature on financial markets argues that interest rates fail to 
bring about equilibrium in markets with imperfect information (Bester, 1985; Cho, 
1986; Jaffee and Russell~ 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Even with flexible interest 
rates, the existence of imperfect information creates risk which induces credit 
rationing as rational, profit-maximizing behavior for banks. Credit rationing occurs 
when loan demand is higher than loan supply so that some borrowers receive no 
loans at all and others receive less than the amount applied for. 
This study analyzes the rationing mechanisms used by banks in the rural 
1 
2 
financial markets of the Philippines. The intensity and incidence of credit rationing 
are compared among bank types, and models are employed to test the factors 
expected to explain this rationing. 
II. Conceptual Framework 
Bank lending behavior can be divided into three stages: the screening stage, 
the acceptance/rejection rationing stage, and the quantity rationing stage. The 
screening of loan applicants is done by bank managers. Prior to filling out the loan 
application, applicants are informally interviewed to assess their creditworthiness and 
eligibility for credit. The quality of applicants encouraged or discouraged to submit 
formal applications will then affect the bank's risk exposure, as well as the degree 
of rationing that will occur after processing and evaluating the information found in 
the loan applications. 
Formal rationing subsequently occurs in two stages. The decision to accept 
or reject the loan is made when enough information has been gathered about the 
applicant to indicate the expected profitability of granting him a loan. If the 
applicant is generally acceptable, the second stage of quantity rationing occurs when 
the actual loan amount is established. Generally, the bank restricts the loan size on 
the basis of a combination of factors such as probability of repayment, interest rate, 
the marginal cost of loan disbursement, and collateral offered. 
These three stages of lending behavior can be formally analyzed within a 
framework where asymmetric information and its ensuing risk implications make 
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credit rationing a rational profit maximizing behavior by banks. Rationing occurs 
through lending behavior that considers the interest rate (r), the ratio of collateral 
to loan amount {c I J, the decision to lend and how much to lend, all of which are 
captured in a, the rationing parameter. This parameter is defined as the ratio of the 
amount received to the amount applied for.· Choice of the optimal combination of 
a, r, and c I L is affected by the lender's assessment of the probability of repayment 
(p ), which is exogenously determined and can only be estimated using proxy vari-
ables, e.g., observable characteristics of the borrowers. The higher is p, the higher 
the chosen a, implying a lesser probability of being rationed. Also the higher is p, 
the lower is either r orclv This relationship is formally stated as a = f(r, clu p) 
where p = g(x) and x is a vector of observable borrower characteristics such as asset 
position, capacity to pay, nature of investment, type of collateral, and previous 
repayment record, among others. Note the implied simultaneity between a and r, 
assuming c I L is fixed, due to the effect of p. At the optimum, the bank chooses an 
a*, which is based on the combined effects of r, c I L' and p and is indicative of the 
bank's rationing behavior. 
III. The Screening and Rationing Behavior of Banks 
The data used in this study were collected from 65 banks of which 22 were 
rural banks (RBs), 16 were private development banks (PDBs), and 27 were 
branches of four commercial banks (KBs ), randomly chosen from eight provinces in 
the Philippines and refer to 1986 banking operations. The data were collected as 
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part of a comparative bank study jointly undertaken by the Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies and the Agricultural Credit Policy Council. 
Analysis of the survey results showed that credit rationing exists in rural 
financial markets in the Philippines and that there are differences in the rationing 
behavior of the three bank types. One significant result is that the screening and 
acceptance/rejection rationing behavior of branches of KBs and PDBs were more 
restrictive than those for RBs. Only 58 and 60 applicants out of every 100 were 
invited to fill out loan applications in KBs and PDBs, respectively, while as many as 
90 out of 100 were invited to do so in RBs. In the formal processing stage (i.e., 
acceptance and rejection), results indicated a slightly higher degree of rationing: a 
lower approval rate for KBs and PDBs than for RBs. The greater incidence of 
screening and loan rejection for KBs and PDBs may likely grow out of their relative 
bias for greater prudence and risk aversion combined with less desire to engage in 
rural lending compared to other banking activities. 
The results also indicated that the rationing behavior of the three types of 
banks is influenced by factors such as the capacity to pay, the bank-client relation-
ship, and collateral. RBs exhibit a strong bias towards a well-developed bank-client 
relationship in their rationing behavior as shown by the high ratio (81 percent) of 
repeat borrowers among those granted loans in 1986, compared with KBs (58 
percent) and PDBs (54 percent). 
These results are corroborated by the analysis of data obtained from a sample 
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of 344 bank client profiles of those granted loans in 1986 from PDBs and RBs. 
These loans present evidence on quantity rationing, the third and final stage of the 
rationing process.1 The data on quantity rationing for PDBs and RBs strongly 
suggest that the degree of quantity rationing, measured by the ratio of loan granted 
to loan applied for, is minimal for all borrowers of PDBs and RBs. This is consistent 
with the screening and rationing behavior of the 65 banks in which it was found that 
the rejection rate is highest at the screening stage when the manager is the major 
decision-maker. In most cases, the loan amount applied for is discussed and agreed 
upon by both the manager and the borrower during this informal screening stage, so 
that the borrower is almost certain of getting the loan amount requested in the 
application. Quantity rationing would then take place only when the bank discovers 
additional characteristics of the borrower, e.g., loan delinquency with other banks, 
that would require such action. 
IV. A Test for the Intensity and Incidence of Quantity Rationing 
There are two ways of testing for quantity rationing: intensity or degree of 
quantity rationing and incidence or likelihood that a borrower is quantity-rationed. 
The test for intensity of quantity rationing determines what factors significantly affect 
the bank's decision to quantity-ration, i.e., reduce the loan ainotint granted, and how 
much quantity-rationing is done. The test for incidence of quantity rationing predicts 
1 A sample of loans from KBs could not be obtained due to limitations on access 
to client-based bank records. 
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whether the borrower will be quantity-rationed or not based on some factors 
obseiVed by the bank. 
Two types of models are estimated to account for these tests using data from 
344 randomly selected client profiles of those granted loans in 1986 from RBs and 
PDBs. The quantity-rationing model testing for the intensity of rationing is: 
Log L/ A = f(log INT, log COLL, AREA, log INC, log MAT, log CL, DEP 
DEL, CCROP, BANK) 
where L /A = ratio of loan amount granted to loan amount applied for, 
INT = effective interest rate, 
COLL = market value of the collateral offered to secure the loan, 
AREA = area of land owned, 
INC = value of total income for the year, 
MAT = maturity of the loan in number of months, 
CL = ratio of collateral value to loan amount granted, 
DEP = number of dependents, 
DEL = dummy variable for delinquency record: 
1 for borrower with delinquency record, 
0 otherwise, 
CCROP = dummy variable for cash crops: 
1 for cash crops, 
0 otherwise, 
BANK = dummy variable for bank type: 
1 for PDBs, 
0 for RBs. 
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A two-stage least squares method was used to estimate the parameters of the model 
to account for the simultaneity between the interest rate, INT, and the rationing 
parameter a = L /A" 
The qualitative-response model, on the other hand, predicts the probability 
of a borrower being quantity-rationed and is of the form: 
Bi = 11(ai = 1) = f(r, c/u p), p = g(Xi, i= 1, ... ,n) 
where ai = 1 if a < 1 or L < A 
0 if a= 1 or L = A 
This model uses the same explanatory variables as the quantity-rationing model and 
was estimated using the logit method. Since all the variables included in these 
models are data routinely collected by the banks, the models represent a test of the 
factors the banks presumably use in making loan allocation decisions. 
The best-fit estimates for the two models are presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
Separate equations were estimated per bank type because the bank type dummy 
variable test yielded a significant result, implying that PDBs behave differently from 
RBs regarding quantity rationing (see Lapar, 1988 for details of tests). 
The first model suggests that interest rate, area of land owned, length of loan, 
number of dependents, and cash crop production significantly explain the intensity 
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of quantity rationing by RBs. As interest rates rise, or land ar4a inc;re~ Qf 
number of dependents rise, there is significantly less rationing in RBs (i,e., the ratio 
L /A rises). On the other hand, as the loan maturity lengthens and/or cash crops. are 
financed (coffee, cassava, coconuts, sugar), the more severe is the quantity rationing 
in RBs. For PDBs, rationing increases with increases in length of loan and number 
of dependents, while it decreases with higher collateral-to-loan ratios. Both RBs and 
PDBs tend to ration borrowers of long-term loans. RBs ration borrowers investing 
in cash crops more than non-cash crops, while PDBs ration borrowers with lower 
collateral-to-loan ratios and larger family size. 
The second model results reported in Table 2 explain the probability of a 
borrower being rationed. For RBs, the probability of rationing decreases with 
increases in interest rate, collateral, farm size, and number of dependents, but 
increases with length of loan. For PDBs, the probability of rationing increases with 
income and loan maturity. The interest rate variable is insignificant. This is consis-
tent with the known practice of PDBs to require reasonably well-off borrowers to 
participate in long-term loan financing through larger equity contributions, thereby 
making borrowers who have the capacity to pay to share a larger part of the risk of 
their investment financing. 
It should be noted that PDBs engage in far more restrictive initial rationing 
behavior than RBs (i.e., during the informal screening stage and the first formal 
rationing stage of approval/rejection), and hence appear to be more risk averse in 
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their rural lending activity. In the third stage of quantity rationing for loans already 
approved, RB rationing behavior emerges strongly as seen in Tables 1 and 2. Thus, 
during the first two stages of this three-stage sequence, RB managers, relatively 
speaking, are much less likely to engage in screening and rationing behavior that 
implies outright rejection. However, once the loan application has been approved 
in principle, RB managers engage in more intense quantity rationing. 
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Survey results have established empirical support for credit rationing in the 
rural financial markets of the Philippines and confrrmed the theoretical argument 
that credit rationing can prevail in a deregulated financial system characterized by 
imperfect information. In the Philippines, this imperfect market for information was 
reinforced by the growing risks of financial activity in the recessionary environment 
of the 1980s. 
Banks were observed to engage in an informal initial screening of potential 
borrowers usually carried out by the bank manager. This screening activity was 
widely practiced by KBs and PDBs. The relatively higher incidence of this screening 
behavior in these two bank types implies a more restrictive criteria for accepting loan 
applicants compared to RBs. These results seem to confirm· the widely held view 
that KBs and PDBs are more risk averse and less committed to rural lending than 
RBs. 
In the subsequent stages of loan processing, two types of credit rationing were 
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observed: strong credit rationing entailing outright rejection and weak credit ration-
ing wherein the borrower was not rejected but given a loan less than the amount 
requested. The incidence of strong credit rationing was higher in PDBs and K.Bs 
than in RBs, while RBs engaged in significant quantity rationing. 
The results of this survey suggest that even in a regime of market-oriented 
interest rates small and marginal borrowers will experience restricted access to loans 
due to risk considerations from imperfect information. Alternative solutions besides 
deregulated interest rates have to be devised to minimize these constraints. 
Measures that help to reduce risks and information costs may have to be initiated, 
e.g., setting up a roster of "good" small farmer clientele for banks by NGOs or PVOs, 
or improving the guarantee programs that are designed for these types of borrowers. 
Rural credit unions may also become a more important type of institution to serve 
this marginal clientele. 
Finally, loan collateral is an important determinant of rationing behavior with 
land mortgages being the most important form of collateral accepted by these banks. 
The lack of clear land title for prospective land reform beneficiaries in the 
Philippines could seriously restrict their future access to loans from the formal 
banking system. This potential for negative externalities through the financial system 
needs to be taken into account as the country designs measures to implement land 
reform. 
Table 1 
Estimates of the Effect of Loan Terms and Observable 
Characteristics of Borrowers on Intensity of Rationing, 
By Type of Bank 
Variable PDBs RBs 
CONSTANT 
Log INT 
AREA 
Log INC 
Log MAT 
LogCL 
DEP 
CCROP 
Rz 
F-Stat 
N 
Note: Dependent Variable = Log(L /A) 
* Significant at 1 percent. 
* * Significant at 5 percent. 
* * * Significant at 10 percent. 
0.907 
(1.636) 
-0.111 
(-1.144) 
-0.030 
(-1.092) 
-0.118 
(-3.428)* 
0.148 
(2.953)* 
-0.034 
( -1.862)* * * 
0.347 
5.564* 
44 
-0.245 
( -0.477) 
0.244 
(2.669)* 
0.004 
(2.191)** 
-0.014 
(-0.448) 
-0.214 
(-2.662)* 
-0.039 
(-1.258) 
0.028 
(2.570)** 
-0.386 
(-5.288)* 
0.254 
6.794* 
120 
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Table 2 
Estimates of the Effect of Loan Terms and Observable Characteristics 
of Borrowers on the Incidence of Rationing, 
by Type of Bank 
Variable 
CONSTANT 
Log INT 
LogCOLL 
AREA 
Log INC 
Log MAT 
LogCL 
DEP 
DEL 
Log likelihood 
Likelihood ratio 
N 
Note: Dependent Variable = 1 if L < A 
0 if L =A 
* Significant at 1 percent. 
* * Significant at 5 percent. 
* * * Significant at 10 percent. 
PDBs 
-55.001 
(-2.100)** 
-8.809 
(-1.317) 
2.689 
(1.821)*** 
12.617 
(2.017)** 
0.196 
(0.592) 
-7.238 
14.475 
54 
RBs 
3.836 
(0.497) 
-5.661 
(-3.282)* 
-0.344 
(-0.758)** 
-0.287 
(-2.453)** 
0.696 
(1.020) 
4.226 
(2.313)** 
0.712 
(1.216) 
-0.311 
(-1.783)*** 
1.544 . 
(1.180) 
-29.995 
152.682* 
120 
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